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BOOK REVIEW
HARLAN: THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY.
Edited by David L. Shapiro. Cambridge: The Harvard University
Press. 1969. pp. xxvii, 311. $6.95.
"[J]udges," said Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate, but they
can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
motions."'
The delicate balance of power inherent in the supremacy of judi-
cial review depends for its continuance upon judicial restraint, self-
imposed. The opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan furnish welcome sanctu-
ary in an era of judicial legislation which threatens that balance.
A reading of the selected opinions quickly points up the difference
between the jurist who sometimes "utters a happy phrase from a pro-
tected cloister," and the experienced realist who recognizes the proper
role of continuity and tradition. Our jurists are called to the courts
from a great variety of backgrounds-ranging from elective offices in-
volving little lawyer's work, to deep experience in the practice of law.
Justice Harlan's background is of the latter variety. Educated at
Princeton, Oxford and the New York Law School, he became one of
the nation's leading trial and appellate lawyers.
While decrying any intention "of turning into a solemn old her-
mit" on the bench, Justice Harlan has come close to his own ideal, for
a judge, of becoming a man apart.
In his fifteen years on the Supreme Court bench, Mr. Justice Har-
lan has, according to the authors, ".... reached the same result as the
majority but by a very different route. ' 2 To ascribe this divergence,
as have the authors (and the Justice himself) to inadequate advocacy
within the Court, is at best an oversimplification.
Rather, the divergence involves nothing less than the question on
which the survival of our republic depends: Where may power safely
repose? This is the question which haunted the fathers of our federal
system.
Jefferson warned us that "the people"3 are the only safe reposi-
tories of governmental power; and his writings respecting the alloca-
'Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
2
p. Xxv.
3Letter to A. Coray, October 31, 1823 , in THE WRMNGS OF THOMAS J-FF-SSON
483 (A. Lipscomb ed. 19o5).
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tions of power should give pause to today's master planners-whether
found in the courts or in the innumerable warrens of the executive
branch.
This resistance to usurpation of prerogative is the thread which
winds throughout the opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan. The introduc-
tory materials of the editors are somewhat disappointing for their
failure sufficiently to identify the thread. It is clearly visible, however,
in the selected opinions, which are well chosen and logically arranged.
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